What are the effects of blocking patents on R&D and consumption? This paper develops a quality-ladder growth model with overlapping intellectual property rights and capital accumulation to quantitatively evaluate the effects of blocking patents. The analysis focuses on two policy variables (a) patent breadth that determines the amount of profits created by an invention, and (b) the profit-sharing rule that determines the distribution of profits between current and former inventors along the quality ladder. The model is calibrated to aggregate data of the US economy. Under parameter values that match key features of the US economy and show equilibrium R&D underinvestment, I find that reducing the extent of blocking patents by changing the profit-sharing rule would lead to a significant increase in R&D, consumption and welfare. Also, the paper derives and quantifies a dynamic distortionary effect of patent policy on capital accumulation.
Introduction
What are the effects of blocking patents on research and development (R&D)? In an environment with sequential innovations, the scope of a patent (i.e. patent breadth) determines the level of patent protection for an invention against imitation and subsequent innovations. This latter form of patent protection, which is known as leading breadth in the literature, gives the patentholders property rights over future inventions. Because of the resulting overlapping intellectual property rights, an infringing inventor may have to share her profits with the infringed patentholders and have less incentive to invest in R&D. This negative dimension of overlapping intellectual property rights is known as blocking patents.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop an R&D-driven endogenous-growth model to quantitatively evaluate the effects of blocking patents. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to perform a quantitative analysis on patent policy by calibrating a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model that combines the following features (a) overlapping intellectual property rights emphasized by the patent-design literature, (b) multiple R&D externalities commonly discussed in the growth literature, and (c) endogenous capital accumulation that leads to a dynamic distortionary effect of patent protection on saving and investment. As Acemoglu (p. 1112 Acemoglu (p. , 2007 writes, "… we lack a framework similar to that used for the analysis of the effects of capital and labor income taxes and indirect taxes in public finance, which we could use to analyze the effects… of intellectual property right polices… on innovation and economic growth."
The analysis focuses on two policy variables (a) patent breadth that determines the amount of profits created by an invention, and (b) the profit-sharing rule that determines the distribution of profits between current and former inventors along the quality ladder. Because of overlapping intellectual property rights, the current inventor, who infringes the patents of some former inventors, has to share her profits with the infringed patentholders and extract profits from future inventors. As a result, the income stream received by an inventor is delayed. If the growth rate of profits is lower than the interest rate, then the stream of profits received by an inventor has a lower present value, which reduces the incentive to invest in R&D. In other words, overlapping intellectual property rights have a positive effect as well as a negative effect on R&D. On one hand, the consolidation of market power between patentholders increases the amount of profits created by an invention that leads to a positive effect on R&D. On the other hand, the lower present value of profits received by an inventor due to profit sharing leads a negative effect. For the rest of the paper, I will refer to the positive (negative) dimension of overlapping intellectual property rights as patent breadth (blocking patents). Although the two effects are interrelated, it is possible to have a reduction in the extent of blocking patents without changing the level of patent breadth, and vice versa.
In order to quantify the effects of blocking patents and other externalities associated with R&D investment, the model is calibrated to aggregate data of the US economy. The key equilibrium condition, which is used to identify the effects of blocking patents on R&D, can be derived analytically without relying on the entire structure of the DGE model. In particular, it can be derived from two conditions (a) a zero-profit condition in the R&D sector, and (b) a no-arbitrage condition that determines the market value of patents. The DGE model serves the useful purpose in providing a structural interpretation on this equilibrium condition.
The main result is the following. Blocking patents have a significant and negative effect on R&D.
Holding patent breadth constant, minimizing the effects of blocking patents would increase the steadystate R&D share of GDP by at least over 10% (percent change). This result has important policy implications. Given previous empirical estimates on the social rate of return to R&D, the market economy underinvests in R&D relative to the social optimum, and the reduction in the extent of blocking patents helps increasing R&D towards the socially optimal level. It is important to emphasize that the DGE model has been made rich enough to be consistent with either R&D overinvestment or underinvestment by combining blocking patents with multiple R&D externalities. Whether the market economy overinvests or underinvests in R&D depends crucially on the degree of externalities in intratemporal duplication and intertemporal knowledge spillovers, which in turn is calibrated from the balanced-growth condition between long-run total factor productivity (TFP) growth and R&D. The larger is the fraction of long-run TFP growth driven by R&D, the larger are the social benefits of R&D and the more likely for the market economy to underinvest in R&D. I use previous empirical estimates for the social rate of return to R&D to calibrate this fraction.
Furthermore, when the effects of blocking patents are mitigated, the balanced-growth level of consumption increases permanently by a minimum of 3% (percent change). Taking into account the transition dynamics, social welfare (defined as the lifetime utility of the representative household)
increases by a minimum of 1.7%. Finally, I identify and analytically derive a dynamic distortionary effect of patent protection on saving and investment that has been neglected by previous studies on patent policy, which focus mostly on the static distortionary effect of markup pricing. 1 The dynamic distortion arises because the monopolistic markup in the patent-protected industries creates a wedge between the marginal product of capital and the rental price. Proposition 1 shows that (a) the market equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital is below the socially optimal level if there is underinvestment in R&D, and (b) an increase in the markup would lead to a further reduction in the equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital. The numerical exercise also quantifies the discrepancy between the equilibrium 1 Laitner (1982) is the first study that identifies in an exogenous growth model with overlapping generations of households that the existence of an oligopolistic sector and its resulting pure profit as financial assets creates both the usual static distortion and an additional dynamic distortion on capital accumulation due to the crowding out of households' portfolio space. The current paper extends this study to show that this dynamic distortion also plays an important role and through a different channel in an R&D-growth model in which both patents and physical capital are owned by households as financial assets.
capital-investment rate and the socially optimal level and shows that reducing the extent of blocking patents helps to decrease this discrepancy slightly.
Literature Review
This paper provides an effective method through the reduction in the extent of blocking patents to mitigate the R&D-underinvestment problem suggested by Jones and Williams (1998) Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) . These studies are also qualitatively oriented and do not feature capital so that the dynamic distortionary effect of patent policy is absent.
In terms of quantitative analysis on patent policy, this paper relates to Chu (2007) . Using a variety-expanding model similar to Romer (1990) , Chu (2007) finds that whether or not extending the patent length would lead to a significant increase in R&D depends crucially on the patent-value depreciation rate. At the empirical range of patent-value depreciation rates estimated by previous studies, extending the patent length has limited effects on R&D. Therefore, Chu (2007) and the current paper together provide a comparison on the relative effectiveness of extending the patent length and reducing the extent of blocking patents in mitigating the R&D-underinvestment problem. The crucial difference between these two policy instruments arises because extending the patent length increases future profits while reducing the extent of blocking patents raises current profits for an inventor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 defines the equilibrium and analyzes its properties. Section 4 calibrates the model and presents the numerical results.
The final section concludes with some policy implications.
The Model
The model is a generalized version of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992 with labor and capital. The markup in these monopolistic industries drives a wedge between the marginal product of capital and the rental price. Consequently, it leads to a dynamic distortionary effect that causes the equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital to deviate from the social optimum. The R&D sector also uses both labor and capital as factor inputs.
To prevent the model from overestimating the social benefits of R&D and the extent of R&D underinvestment, the long-run TFP growth is assumed to be driven by R&D as well as an exogenous process as in Comin (2004) . The class of first-generation R&D-driven endogenous-growth models, such as Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) , exhibits scale effects and is inconsistent with the empirical evidence in Jones (1995a) . 3 In the model, scale effects are eliminated as in Segerstrom (1998) . The various components of the model are presented in Sections 2.1-2.6.
Households
There is a unit continuum of identical infinitely-lived households, who maximize life-time utility that is a function of per-capita consumption t c (numeraire). The standard iso-elastic utility function is given by 
Final Goods
This sector is characterized by perfect competition, and the producers take both the output and input prices as given. The production function for the final goods t Y is a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator over a unit continuum of differentiated quality-enhancing intermediate goods
The familiar aggregate price index is
Intermediate Goods
There is a unit-continuum of industries producing the differentiated quality-enhancing intermediate goods. Each industry is dominated by a temporary industry leader, who owns the patent for the latest R&D-driven technology in the industry. The production function in each industry has constant returns to scale in labor and capital inputs and is given by
are respectively the capital and labor inputs for producing intermediate-goods j at time t.
represents an exogenous process of productivity improvement that is common across all industries and is freely available to all producers. is the number of inventions that has occurred in industry j as of time t. The marginal cost of production in industry j is
where t R is the rental price of capital.
Patent Breadth
Before providing the underlying derivations, this section firstly presents the Bertrand equilibrium price and the amount of profits created by an invention under different levels of patent breadth η .
to denote the markup. The expression for the equilibrium price is consistent with the seminal work of Gilbert and Shapiro's (1990) interpretation of "breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price." A broader patent breadth corresponds to a larger η . Therefore, an increase in patent breadth increases the amount of profits created by an invention and potentially enhances the incentives for R&D. This is the positive effect of overlapping intellectual property rights emphasized by the patent-design literature. an example in which the degree of leading breadth is one. 4 The current inventor may capture only a fraction of these profits due to profit sharing with former inventors. 5 See Li (2001) for a discussion on incomplete lagging breadth.
In this example, a leading breadth of degree one facilitates the most recent inventor (i.e. 
, where 
Aggregation
as the aggregate level of R&D-driven technology. Also, define total labor and capital inputs for production as
respectively. The aggregate production function for the final goods is (10)
The market-clearing condition for the final goods is 
is the total amount of monopolistic profits and given by
≡ . Therefore, the growth rate of monopolistic profits equals the growth rate of output. The factor payments for labor and capital inputs employed in the intermediate-goods sector are respectively
(15) shows that the markup drives a wedge between the marginal product of capital and its rental price.
As will be shown later, this wedge creates a dynamic distortionary effect that decreases the rate of capital investment. Finally, the correct value of GDP should include R&D investment such that
L , and t r K , are respectively the number of workers and the amount of capital for R&D. 7 In the national income account, private spending in R&D is treated as an expenditure on intermediate goods.
Therefore, the values of investment and GDP in the data are t I and t Y respectively. The Bureau of Economic Analysis and the National Science Foundation's R&D satellite account provides preliminary estimates on the effects of including R&D as an intangible asset in the national income accounts.
R&D
as the market value of the patent for the i-th most recent invention in industry j. The Cobb-Douglas specification in (4) implies that
. This fact together with the symmetry of the profit-sharing rule across industries implies that (17) ) (
Proof: See Appendix A. 
To eliminate scale effects and capture various externalities, I follow previous studies to assume that R&D productivity t ϕ is a decreasing function in t A and given by 
Decentralized Equilibrium
In this section, I firstly define the decentralized equilibrium. Then, Section 3.1 summarizes the system of equations that characterizes the transition dynamics. Section 3.2 derives the balanced-growth path. Section 3.3 discusses the effects of blocking patents. Section 3.4 derives the socially optimal allocations and the dynamic distortionary effect of patent protection.
The equilibrium is a sequence of prices
and a sequence of allocations 
Aggregate Equations of Motion
The transition dynamics of the model is characterized by a system of differential equations. The capital stock is a predetermined variable and evolves according to (25) 
R&D-driven technology is also a predetermined variable and evolves according to (23 
Balanced-Growth Path
On the balanced-growth path, t c increases at c g , so that the steady-state real interest rate from (3) is
Using (23) and (24), the balanced-growth rate of R&D technology
is given by From the aggregate production function (10), the balanced-growth rates of output and capital are
Using (27) and (29), the balanced-growth rate of R&D-driven technology is determined by the exogenous labor-force growth rate n and productivity growth rate Z g given by 
Blocking Patents
Equating the first-order conditions (14) and (20) and imposing the balanced-growth condition on R&D-driven technology yield the steady-state R&D share of factor inputs given by
. The backloading discount factor is defined as
that will be discussed in further details below. Using (13) - (15), (31) (33) is simply R&D as a share of GDP, whose data is readily available in the US.
Provided that µ , λ , r and Y g can be probably calibrated, (33) provides an equilibrium condition that can be used to identify the value of ν in the US economy. A small value of ν indicates a severe problem of blocking patents. An advantage of this approach is that it does not require the knowledge of η or η Ω .
However, a potential criticism is that the equilibrium condition is derived from the DGE model, whose structure may not be a realistic description of the real economy.
Fortunately, Appendix B shows that (33) does not rely on the entire structure of the DGE model and can be derived from (a) a zero-profit condition in the R&D sector, and (b) a no-arbitrage condition that determines the market value of patents. The DGE model serves the useful purpose in providing a structural interpretation on ν as the backloading discount factor, which captures the effects of blocking patents caused by overlapping intellectual property rights. (32) shows that holding the level of patent breadth (i.e. η ) constant, increasing the profit share of a more recent inventor (e.g. increase 
Socially Optimal Allocations
This section firstly characterizes the socially optimal allocations and then derives the dynamic distortion of patent policy on capital accumulation. To derive the socially optimal capital-investment rate and R&D share of factor inputs, the social planner chooses If the market economy underinvests in R&D as also suggested by Jones and Williams (1998) and (2000), the government may want to increase patent breadth to reduce the extent of this market failure.
However, the following proposition states that even holding the effects of blocking patents constant, an increase in η mitigates the problem of R&D underinvestment at the costs of worsening the dynamic distortionary effect on capital accumulation.
Proposition 1: The equilibrium rate of capital investment is below the socially optimal level if there is underinvestment in R&D. Holding the backloading discount factor constant, an increase in patent breadth leads to a reduction in the equilibrium rate of capital investment.
Proof: (35) and (36) 
Calibration
Using the framework developed above, this section provides a quantitative assessment on the effects of blocking patents. Figure 1 shows that in the US, private spending on R&D as a share of GDP has been rising sharply since the beginning of the 80's. Then, after a few years, the number of patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office also began to increase as shown in Figure 2 . Given the changes in patent policy in the 80's, 8 the structural parameters are calibrated using long-run aggregate data of the US's economy from 1953 to 1980 to examine the extent of R&D underinvestment and the effects of blocking patents before these policy changes. The goal of this numerical exercise is to quantify the effects of eliminating blocking patents on R&D, consumption, welfare and capital investment.
Backloading Discount Factor
The first step is to calibrate the structural parameters and the steady-state value of the backloading discount factor ν . The average annual TFP growth rate TFP g is 1.33%, 9 and the average labor-force growth rate n is 1.94%. 10 The annual depreciation rate δ on physical capital and the household's discount rate ρ are set to conventional values of 8% and 4% respectively. For the markup µ , Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) estimate that the markup is about 1.1 (i.e. a 10% markup) in the US; on the other hand, Basu (1996) and Basu and Fernald (1997) (33) shows that holding other variables constant, an increase in λ must be offset by a decrease in ν to hold the level of R&D constant. Therefore, at higher values of λ , the calibrated effects of blocking patents would be even more severe. (38) , and (c) capital-investment rate in (39). 8 See, for example, Jaffe (2000), Gallini (2002) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004) for a discussion. 9 Multifactor productivity for the private non-farm business sector is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 10 The data on the annual average size of the labor force is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 11 A higher markup would imply a more severe effect of blocking patents. Intuitively, a higher markup means increased profitability which must be offset by a stronger effect of blocking patents in order to hold the level of R&D in the data constant. In this case, eliminating blocking patents would lead to a more significant increase in R&D and consumption. 12 For example, Caballero and Jaffe (2002) estimate a mean rate of creative destruction of about 4%. Lanjouw (1998) estimate a patent renewal model using patent renewal data from Germany for a number of industries, and the estimated probability of obsolescence ranges 7% for computer patents to 12% for engine patents. share of GDP is 0.0115. 13 Labor share is set to a conventional value of 0.7, and the average ratio of private investment to GDP is 0.203. The calibrated value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (i.e. σ / 1 ) is about 0.42, which is closed to the empirical estimates suggested by Guvenen (2006) . The implied real interest rate is about 8.4%, which is slightly higher than the historical rate of return on the US's stock market, and this higher interest rate implies a lower socially optimal level of R&D spending in (34) and a higher steady-state value of the backloading discount factor in (33) . As a result, the model is less likely to overstate the extent of R&D underinvestment and the degree of blocking patents. Furthermore, the fact that the calibrated 13 The data is obtained from the National Science Foundation and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. R&D is net of federal spending, and GDP is net of government spending. The data on R&D in 1954 and 1955 is not available. 14 The data is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and GDP is net of government spending. 
∈ ν
are smaller than one suggests a severe degree of blocking patents in the US economy. Therefore, reducing the extent of blocking patents may be an effective method to stimulate R&D. After calibrating the externality parameters and computing the socially optimal level of R&D spending, the effects of reducing the extent of blocking patents on consumption will be quantified.
Externality Parameters
The second step is to calibrate the values for the externality parameters γ (intratemporal duplication) and φ (intertemporal knowledge spillovers). To do this, I need to first determine the value of A g by setting
. The parameter ξ captures the fraction of long-run TFP growth driven by R&D, and the remaining fraction is driven by the exogenous process t Z such that
For each value of ξ , TFP g , n , and α , the balanced-growth condition (30) determines a unique value for ) 1 /( φ γ − , which is sufficient to determine the effects of R&D on consumption in the long run. However, holding ) 1 /( φ γ − constant, a larger γ implies a faster rate of convergence to the balanced-growth path.
Therefore, to determine the socially optimal level of R&D, it is important to consider different values of γ . To reduce the plausible parameter space of γ and φ , I make use of the empirical estimates for the social rate of return to R&D. Following Jones and Williams' (1998) derivation, Appendix C shows that the net social rate of return r to R&D can be expressed as
After setting r to the lower bound of 0.30 as in Williams (1998, 2000) , (30) and (40) pin down a unique value of γ and φ for each value of ξ . For lower values of ξ , the implied social return to R&D would be less than 0.3. Table 3 shows that as ξ Table 2 : Calibrated Externality Paramaters
Socially Optimal Level of R&D Spending
This section calculates the socially optimal R&D share of GDP in (34) . Figure 3 plots the socially optimal R&D share for each set of parameter values in Table 2 that corresponds to r equal 0.30.
[insert Figure 3 here] Figure 3 shows that there was underinvestment in R&D in the US over the entire range of parameters. In a sense, this finding is not surprising given the large estimated social return to R&D. Optimal R&D share increases in ξ in Figure 3 because a larger ξ implies a larger Table 2 . Applying the log approximation x x ≈ + ) 1 ln( to (C4) and combining it with (34) , it can be shown that 
Eliminating Blocking patents
Given the calibrated parameter values, this section quantifies the effects of eliminating blocking patents on R&D and consumption. Table 3 shows that eliminating blocking patents (i.e. setting 1 = ν ) would lead to a substantial increase in the R&D share of GDP in (33) . The model predicts that R&D share of GDP in the US would increase from 0.0115 in the data to a minimum of 0.0136 (i.e. an increase of 18%) in Table   3 . For a large value of λ , R&D share of GDP may even double. Table 1 shows that the calibrated values for ν decrease in λ ; therefore, as λ increases, the increase in ν to eliminate blocking patents is larger and hence leads to a more significant effect on R&D. [insert Figure 4 here] 15 Note that the coefficients in (42) In addition to examining the effects of blocking patents on long-run consumption, I also consider the transition dynamic effects. I use the relaxation algorithm developed by Trimborn et al. (2008) to compute the transition path of consumption. 16 For the set of parameter values considered before (i.e. Table 2 Table 3 ), upon eliminating blocking patents, consumption falls slightly on impact and then gradually rises to the new balanced-growth path. 17 I use the consumption path up to 100 years after the policy change to calculate the representative household's utility (1) on this new transition path and compare it to the household's original utility on the old balanced-growth path. To have a sense on how important these changes are, an increase of 1.7% (4.8%) in the household's lifetime utility requires a permanent increase in consumption of 1.3% (3.7%).
Dynamic Distortion
Proposition 1 derives the condition under which the equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital is below the socially optimal level. The following numerical exercise quantifies this wedge. Figure 5 presents the socially optimal rates of capital investment in (35) along with the US's investment rate, and the wedge is about 0.014 on average.
[insert Figure 5 here] 16 I would like to thank Timo Trimborn for his advice on the relaxation algorithm. 17 In fact, consumption does not necessarily fall on impact but instead gradually rises to the new balanced-growth path over a wide range of parameters that correspond to a higher social return to R&D (i.e. larger ξ , γ and φ ). In other words, in a model with capital, it is possible for households to avoid short-run consumption losses by running down the capital stock, and this finding is different from models without capital accumulation. See, for example, Kwan and Lai (2003) for an interesting analysis on the transition dynamic effects of patent policy in a varietyexpanding model without capital accumulation. 18 Because the value of the household's utility is negative given that 1 > σ -25 -
The equilibrium rate of investment in physical capital is increasing in the R&D share of capital.
Therefore, eliminating blocking patents also increases the capital-investment rate. Table 5 shows that upon eliminating blocking patents, the steady-state capital-investment rate increases from 0.203 in the data slightly toward the socially optimal level. The calibrated values for ν imply a significant effect of blocking patents. An upper bound of 0.85 for ν is based on a number of assumptions. The first assumption is that the data on R&D investment is reasonably accurate. If there is a large amount of R&D spending not recorded, then the identification of ν using (33) would imply a downward bias on ν (i.e. an overestimate of blocking patents). Secondly, applying (33) to aggregate data requires an assumption that monopolistic profits in the economy are created by patent protection. To the extent that only a small fraction of profits is created by patent protection, the identification of ν using (33) would also imply a downward bias on ν . However, using a very small aggregate markup of 1.03 (i.e. 3% markup) in the calibration reduces this bias. In patent-protected and R&D-intensive industries, the markup and the profit share should be much larger. 19 Finally, the numerical analysis is performed on a semi-endogenous growth model, in which increasing R&D investment has no effect on long-run growth. In the case of a fully endogenous-growth model, raising R&D through the elimination of blocking patents would increase the long-run growth rate of consumption. For example, doubling R&D would increase the R&D-driven TFP growth rate by a factor of γ 2 in the first-generation quality-ladder growth models. So long as ξ and γ are not negligible, this kind of increase in the long-run growth rate would have tremendous effects on welfare. Therefore, the calibrated effects from a semi-endogenous growth model are likely to be conservative.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to accomplish three objectives. Firstly, it develops a quantitative framework that can be applied to evaluate the effects of blocking patents. Secondly, it applies the model to aggregate data to perform hypothetical policy experiments. Thirdly, it identifies a dynamic distortionary effect of patent policy on capital accumulation that has been neglected by previous studies. The numerical exercise suggests the following findings. If a non-trivial fraction of TFP growth in the US is driven by R&D, there is underinvestment in R&D in the economy. Then, provided that blocking patents have a significant and negative effect on R&D, reducing this negative effect of overlapping intellectual property rights while keeping its positive effect (i.e. patent breadth) constant can help mitigating the R&D-underinvestment problem. The resulting increase in R&D could lead to a substantial increase in consumption. 19 For example, Comin (2004) considers that a reasonable markup in these industries should be around 1.5.
The readers are advised to interpret the numerical results with some important caveats in mind.
The first caveat is that although the quality-ladder growth model has been generalized as an attempt to capture more realistic features of the US economy, it is still an oversimplification of the real world.
Furthermore, the finding that eliminating blocking patents has substantial and positive effects on R&D and consumption is based on the assumptions that the empirical estimates on the social return to R&D and the data on R&D investment are reasonably accurate. The validity of these assumptions remains as an empirical question. 180,000 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 
